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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature 0f the Case.

A.

Plaintiff/Appellant

David Luj an

(hereinafter Luj an) obtained funds for

Defendant/Respondent Junior Hillbroom (hereinafter Hillbroom) from Hillbroom father’s
Luj an was employed by the trustee of a 1999

from the

Keith Weibel, Which held the funds obtained

trust,

Luj an obtained funds for the trust but was not paid his entire

estate.

after obtained a judgment in excess

estate.

fee.

Lujan there

0f $3,000,000 against Hillbroom as trustee and against the

co-trustee 0f the 1999 trust.

owned property

Luj an discovered in 2018 that Hillbroom personally
Idaho. In 2019, Luj an learned that Hillbroom had obtained

trustee

0f a

trust

0f a very similar name t0 the 1999

Hillbroom and Keith Weibel. Luj an ﬁled
little

B.

trust

title

Bonner County,

to that property in

Which had the same

suit to set aside the transfer as

2008 from a

trustees

—

a fraudulent transfer a

over four months after he discovered the transfer.

Proceedings Below.
Hillbroom moved for summary judgment claiming Luj an did not ﬁle

after

in

he could have reasonably discovered the transfer from the

trust t0

suit

within a year

Hillbroom. Luj an

responded and requested more time to conduct discovery. The motion for further discovery was
denied and the District Court granted Hillbroom

summary judgment and dismissed Lujan’s

entire

complaint.

C.

Facts.

Defendant Junior Hillbroom (hereinafter Hillbroom)
Hillblom.(R.9, ﬂ5)1 Hillbroom

1

The complaint

is

not veriﬁed but

is

was a minor

incorporated

at the

a pretermitted heir 0f Larry L.

time 0f Larry L. Hillbroom’s death and had a

by reference
1

is

in the Declaration 0f David Lujan, R. 104,

112.

guardian. (R.9—10,

116)

That guardian hired David Luj an (hereinafter Luj an) t0 secure

Hillbroom’s portion 0f Larry L. Hillbroom’s estate and agreed t0 pay Luj an a contingency fee

based 0n a percentage 0f the recovery.
Junior Larry Hillbroom Trust

The

estate. (R.10, 1T7)

Wiebel entered

was created

trustee 0f the

into a

(id)

new

1999

Larry Hillbroom’s estate was settled in

(hereinafter the 1999 trust) t0 receive funds

trust

was Keith Wiebel

contingency fee agreement With Luj an in 1999. (R.10,

The JLH Trust did not pay Luj an What was due

On

suit in the

September

Superior Court in

18th,

from the

(hereinafter Wiebel). (R.10, 1T7)

The JLH Trust received signiﬁcant funds from Lujan’s work from 2004

and Lujan ﬁled

Guam and the

t0

him pursuant t0

Guam.

(R. 8-9,

11

118)

t0 2009. (R.1 1, 1H 1)

the contingency fee agreement

1)

2018, Lujan obtained a judgment for $3,791,125.97 against Weibel

personally and as trustee 0f the 1999 trust and against Hillbroom in his capacity as trustee 0f the

1999

trust.

The judgment was properly recorded

Hillbroom alleges that he started another

May

14th,

the

(R. 8-9, 111)

trust called the Junior

2005

trust)

Hillbroom Trust, dated

(R.61-62, 115-6) Hillbroom and Wiebel were co-trustees 0f the 2005

(R.67) In 2006, during the time the 1999 trust

2005

Bonner County.

2005, separate from the 1999 trust and organized under different law (hereinafter

referred t0 as the

trust.

in

trustees

incurring ﬁnancial obligations to Lujan,

purchased a parcel of property in Bonner County, Idaho. (R65) Lujan did not

know that the 2005
judgment, (R. 105,
ﬁled December

was

trust

119),

6th,

had been

set

up

until

Hillbroom’s declaration in support of summary

but the existence of the trust was alleged in the answer to the complaint

2019. (R33,

112).

In April of 2018, Luj an questioned Hillbroom in a deposition in Saipan about property he

personally

owned

in

Bonner County. (R.70-72) During

about the property having been acquired from the 2005

that questioning,

trust.

Hillbroom said nothing

After obtaining his judgment in

September 2018, Luj an spent a signiﬁcant amount of time and resources attempting
2

t0 locate

assets to satisfy his judgment.

(R105,

covering the subject property, (R. 105,

At
the

this point,

2005

March 2019, Lujan ordered

114)

In

1T4),

which was received 0n April

Lujan discovered the transfer of the subject property

trust.

(R.105,

115)

In his response t0

Lujan ﬁled

suit a little

to

over four months

a litigation guarantee

11th,

2019. (R.105, 1E).

Hillbroom personally from

later.

(R. 105, 116)

summary judgment, Lujan requested pursuant t0

I.R.C.P 56(d), a

determination of the matter be deferred until further discovery could be conducted in order
...ascertain if these claims

amended

herein should be

have any

validity, or that the

to include multiple

to:

Complaint

JLH trusts,

together

With discovering further data establish 0r trace assets and monies

between said trusts and Respondent Junior. These trusts may even
be identical and involve all the same parties in the same or similar
capacities.

(R95)

The motion was denied

in the written opinion as follows:

plaintiff‘s request for additional

consideration, the

time to obtain declarations 0r to take discovery, pursuant to

Idaho Rule 0f Civil Procedure 56(d),
Hillbroom.

“Upon

is

denied.

(R483

153)

Summary judgment was

granted t0

II.

.

ISSUES

ON APPEAL

Did the District Court commit error when it denied Luj an’s motion t0 delay summary
judgment to allow Luj an t0 conduct further discovery without explanation 0r
analysis?

.

Did the

District

this transaction

.

Did the

District

Court commit error when

by

a

name

search

Court commit error When

proper due diligence

it

When that

it

inferred that Luj an could have discovered

inference

is

not supported by the record?

inferred that Lujan did not exercise

When reasonable people could have reached

a different inference

based 0n the undisputed evidence?

.

Did the District Court commit error when it found that a constructive trust could not
be imposed if it found that Hillbroom had created a different trust and not informed
Luj an, funded that trust With money owed t0 Luj an and then used that money to buy
property for himself?

.

Is

Lujan

entitled to attorney’s fees

on appeal?

III.

The

A.

District

Court abused

its

ARGUMENT

discretion

When

it

refused t0 allow Luian additional

time t0 conduct discoverv 0r add indispensable parties. The 2005 Trust was funded
somehow and most likelv bv the 1999 Trust at the same time that trust was receiving
millions because 0f Luian’s work and incurring millions in obligations t0 him.
Luian should have been allowed t0 develop this information.

The decision

t0 grant 0r

deny a motion

to continue a

summary judgment hearing

further discovery pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(d) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

Servs.

Corp, 151 Idaho 552, 572, 261 P.3d 829, 849 (201 1).

discretion

When

it

t0 allow

Taylor

v.

AIA

A District Court does not abuse its

(1) recognizes the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the

boundaries of its

discretion and applies the applicable legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an

exercise of reason. Johannsen

In re Jane Doe,

Cm,

Inc.

v.

I,

in

Idaho Power C0. 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)).

had the discretion

making

Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 429, 196 P.3d 341, 347 (2008) citing

145 Idaho 650, 651, 182 P.3d 707, 708 (2008) (Citing Sun Valley Shopping

“A motion denying
it

v.

to

a continuance under Rule 56(f) Will be upheld if the court ‘recognized

deny the motion,

the decision’”. Fagen, Inc.

P.3d 1193, 1198 (2016) citing

v.

v.

articulated the reasons for so doing

and exercised reason

Lava Beds Wind Park, LLC, 159 Idaho 628, 633, 364

Boise Cascade Corp,

V. Jenkins,

141 Idaho 233, 239, 108 P.3d

380, 386 (2005).

The

District

more importantly,
just denied the

Court here did not acknowledge that the matter was one 0f discretion, but

the District Court provided

no explanation

motion upon consideration. This

supports that discovery likely

is

would have revealed

for

its

ruling.

The

District

Court

an abuse of discretion and the records
facts that

allowed Luj an t0 survive summary

judgment.

“A party

seeking a continuance under Idaho Rule 0f Civil Procedure 56(d) “has the

burden 0f setting out what further discovery would reveal that
5

is

essential t0 justify their

opposition,

judgment.

”

making

clear

Haight

v.

what information

is

sought and

how

it

would preclude summary

Idaho Dep’t ofTransportation, 163 Idaho 383, 389, 414 P.3d 205, 211

(2018), reh'g denied (Mar. 21, 2018).

Luj an’s stated grounds for requesting time t0 conduct discovery were t0 allow the

complaint t0 be amended t0 add additional trusts and t0 trace assets between Hillbroom and these
trusts.

pay the

The record

creates a strong suspicion that the

legal fees the

1999

trust

was

2005

The 2005

incurring.

funded somehow. Given that the record supports that

0f the 1999

was

trust, it

seems

1999

likely the

trust

was created

trust

trust

at least

to avoid

having to

purchased property, so

it

was

one 0f its co-trustees was a trustee

funded the 2005

trust at the

time

When

the 1999

incurring millions in obligations t0 Luj an.

What the

discovery would have revealed

2005

the 1999 trust and the

transactions the

would have
have

to

to

2005

trust

trust.

If the

engaged

in

2005

is

trust

would be

the relevant fraudulent transactions between

was funded by

the 1999 trust, then

subject t0 being set aside and the

have been added as an indispensable party, and

it is

all

2005

the

trust

likely that other parties

would

be added.
Luj an aptly described Hillbroom’s conduct as a shell game. The District Court

committed error when

it

denied Lujan’s request t0 try and unwind the shell game Without

explanation and the reasons for that denial are not readily apparent from the record. This Court

should reverse the order granting summary judgment With instructions to allow Lujan t0 conduct
discovery before responding t0 the motion for

D.

summary judgment.

Court committed error when it inferred that Luian could have
conducted a name search and discovered the transaction between Hillbroom and the
2005 trust because no evidence supports that inference. Even if the inferences are
supported, reasonable people could disagree as t0 whether Luian exercised due
diligence and summarv iudgment was not proper.

The

1.

District

Standard 0f Review

An Appellate
judgment

is

the

same

Court review of a District Court’s ruling 0n a motion for summary
as that 0f the District Court in ruling

0n the motion. Gregory

v.

Stallings,

167 Idaho 123, 468 P.3d 253, 257—58 (2020). The District Court should grant summary

judgment
the

if the

movant

facts

is

moving party shows

entitled to

judgment

n0 genuine dispute

as t0

as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(a).

liberally construed in favor

absence 0f a material fact rests

that there is

of the non-moving party,’ but

at all

120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360, 364 (1991). “Thus,
challenge an element 0f the nonmovant's case, the

‘all

fact

and

disputed

burden 0f proving the

Id, citing

follows that if the

it

initial

“Not only are

‘[t]he

times upon the moving party.”

any material

McCoy v.

Lyons,

moving party

fails t0

burden placed on the moving party has

not been met and therefore does not shift t0 the nonmovant.”

Thomson

v.

Idaho

Ins.

Agency,

Ina, 126 Idaho 527, 531, 887 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1994).
This action would have been tried t0 the Court, so the District Court was free t0 draw

probable inferences arising from the undisputed evidentiary

facts.

Losee

v.

Idaho Ca, 148 Idaho

219, 222, 220 P.3d 575, 578 (2009). Whatever inference the District Court draws from the

undisputed evidence must be supported by the record. Beus

P.3d 1231, 1234 (201

1).

Beus, 15 1 Idaho 235, 238, 254

If reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or

conﬂicting inferences from the undisputed evidence, then

v.

v.

summary judgment

is

draw

improper. Losee

Idaho C0,, 148 Idaho 219, 222, 220 P.3d 575, 578 (2009), Boise Tower ASSOCS.,

LLC v.

Hogland, 147 Idaho 774, 778, 215 P.3d 494, 498 (2009).
2.

N0

evidence supports the Court’s factual ﬁnding that Lujan could have

easily discovered the transaction

Since Mr. Lujan was aware that Hillbroom
District

between Hillbroom and the 2005

owned

trust.

the subject property in 20 1 8, the

Court inferred that “Mr. Luj an could have conducted a name search of the Bonner

County, Idaho, records in April 2018, and presumably, would have discovered Instrument N0.

756186, transferring the subject property to Mr. Hillbroom.” (R. 149) Nothing in the record
supports this inference, Which

As more

is

more 0f a

factual ﬁnding.

fully discussed below, the issue

on summary judgment was When Luj an

reasonably should have discovered the relevant transaction. The District Court found that a

name

search would have revealed

accomplish,

how

long

it

it,

but did not explain What a

would take 0r how

it

Hillbroom owned property in Bonner County.

name

search was, What

it

would

would have revealed anything other than

N0

evidence was in the record t0 support the

inference that Luj an could have discovered the transaction between the 2005 trust and Hillbroom

sooner based 0n the undisputed fact that he

knew about

it

in 2018.

It

was an

error to

make

that

inference.

Furthermore, nothing in the record supports an inference that Luj an could have
discovered the fraudulent nature of the transaction by conducting a

name

search and even if so,

reasonable people could disagree as t0 Whether Luj an exercised proper due diligence so

summary judgment was not proper.
3.

Even

if

the District Court’s conclusion that

Lujan could have discovered

this

transaction shortly after the 2018 deposition, reasonable people could reach

whether Lujan exercised due diligence after he
learned that Hillbroom owned property in Idaho s0 summary judgment was
differing conclusions as to

not proper.

As
undisputed

stated above, the District Court

facts,

is

free to

but if reasonable people could reach differing inferences, then

judgment should be denied. Here, Luj an ordered a
the transaction, he ﬁled suit a

that this

draw the most probable inferences from the

was a proper

little

litigation guarantee

over four months

later.

summary

and when he discovered

Reasonable people could conclude

exercise 0f due diligence.

Idaho Code 55-9180) provides that a cause of action With respect to a transaction under
this act

must be brought within

1

year 0f the date the transfer could reasonably been discovered.
8

A transaction under the act is a transaction made by a debtor With
delay, 0r defraud

1) the actual intent to hinder,

any creditor or 2) was made Without receiving reasonably equivalent value and

the remaining assets of the debtor are unreasonably small in relation to the transaction or the

debtor intended t0 incur further obligations beyond that Which the debtor can pay. Idaho

Ann.

Code

§ 55-906.

Idaho Code 55-9180)
transaction.

is

a statute of limitations based the discovery of a fraudulent

Whether 0r not someone should have reasonably discovered a fraud

due diligence. Davis

v.

Tuma, 167 Idaho 267, 469 P.3d 595, 605 (2020)

citing

is

a question of

McCoy v.

Lyons,

120 Idaho 765, 773, 820 P.2d 360, 368(1991). “The discovery rule applicable t0 fraud requires

more than an awareness

that

something

may be wrong but requires knowledge 0f the

facts

constituting fraud.” Id.

The

District

Court concluded that Lujan could have discovered

run a “name search”.

As

set forth above,

this transaction if he

n0 evidence supports the inference and even

had

if

supported, reasonable people could reach differing inferences as to whether Luj an exercised due
diligence even if he did not run a

If the District Court

discovered by a
a

title

likely

The

correct in

presuming that the transfer could have been

search in Bonner County, nothing in the record supports an inference that

would reveal was

name and

was revealed

2

search.

search would reveal the fraudulent nature of the transaction.

different

was

name

was

“name

likely

that Hillbroom’s predecessor in interest

date than the trust Luj an had sued herein?

in this litigation

— that Hilbroom had

set

slightly different
in

2005

name and
to

remove

the

9

trust

would

n_ot

it

with a slightly

have revealed what

different trust

trust t0 the

would not impart knowledge 0f a
word “Larry” from the title.

date

was a

up a Whole

funded by a fraudulent transfer from the 1999

been amended

It

In fact, the only thing

and

that the trust

2005.

separate trust.

The 1999

trust

could have

Lastly, although not clearly stated in the record,

not from Idaho. Lujan would have no reason to

reasonable to assume that Luj an

it is

know What

a

“name search” was.

In addition,

Luj an ﬁrst ordered a litigation guarantee, then discovered the transfer, and ﬁled suit just a

over four months

later.

it

inferred these

inferences

summary judgment.

evidence supports the inference that Luj an can have conducted a

discovered the relevant transaction nor

When

little

Reasonable people could reach differing conclusions as t0 whether Luj an

exercised due diligence and the District Court should not have granted

N0

is

two

facts,

its

fraudulent nature.

The

District

name

search and

Court committed error

but even if it did not, reasonable people could reach differing

0n whether Lujan exercised due diligence and summary judgment was not proper.

T0

4.

the extent the District Court relied 0n Idaho

constructive notice t0 Lujan, such

was error

Code 55-811

t0

impart

as that code section cannot be

used t0 shield a person from a claim 0f fraud.
It is

not clear if the District Court relied upon Idaho

notice 0f the transaction t0 Luj an, but

it

did,

Idaho Code § 55-811 provides that

such was an

if a

Code

§

error.

purchaser of real property

recorded documents before ﬁnalizing the transaction, the purchaser
constructive

55-811 to impart constructive

knowledge 0f contents 0f recorded documents. Large

is

v.

fails to

deemed

to

search the

have

Caﬂerty Realty, Ina, 123

Idaho 676, 680, 851 P.2d 972, 976 (1993). The statute imports constructive knowledge to a
purchaser for the sole purpose 0f protecting third party’s holding prior recorded interest in real
property from lawsuit. “The purpose and effect of I.C. § 55—811

is

recorded claim 0r lien on the property from claims by other persons
the property after the interest

is

recorded.” Large

v.

to protect persons with a

who

acquire an interest in

Caﬂerly Really, Ina, 123 Idaho 676, 680,

851 P.2d 972, 976 (1993).

As

far

back as 1905, the Idaho Supreme Court has held

provisions 0f Idaho

Code

§

that the constructive notice

55-811 d0 not shield a person from a claim for fraud based 0n
10

misrepresentations 0f the contents of recorded documents.

Eastwood v. Standard Mines

Milling C0,, 11 Idaho 195, 81 P. 382, 383 (1905). The doctrine

is

&

based 0n principles of

equitable estoppel.

A public record is an available means 0f information as t0
who does not take advantage of it cannot
one Who merely fails t0 furnish such

questions 0f title, and one

claim estoppel against

which the representation,
by actively misleading the person setting up the estoppel and
preventing him from having recourse t0 available means 0f
information, has been held t0 excuse his failure to inform himself
information. There are, however, cases in

0f the

facts,

even in the case 0f constructive notice by matter 0f

record.

And more recently and more

directly

0n point

is

Large

v.

Cafferly Realty, Ina, 123 Idaho

676, 851 P.2d 972 (1993).

55—81

however, is not meant t0 be a shield against fraud
and misrepresentation. Large is not Claiming a right in the
I.C. §

1,

property adverse t0 the recorded restrictive covenants. Rather,

Large claims he was induced t0 purchase the property based 0n the
misrepresentations 0f Cafferty and Diversiﬁed in failing to disclose
the existence 0f the restrictive covenants.

Id

at

123 Idaho 676, 680, 851

P.2d 972, 976 (1993).
In this case, the Lujan

Defendants. Lujan

is

is

not claiming t0 have an unrecorded interest adverse t0 the

claiming the Defendants obtained

and Idaho Coe 55-811 does not shield them from
5.

The

The

title

by means 0f a fraudulent

transfer

that claim.

Court had evidence 0f a secret trust being set up for Hillbroom’s
beneﬁt at the same time that another trust for Hillbroom’s beneﬁt was
incurring millions in attorney’s fees. The facts before the District Court are
more than sufﬁcient t0 create a question 0f fact as t0 whether it would be
unconscionable for Hillbroom t0 retain title t0 this property.
District

District

Court held that

“.
.

.the

Complaint and Declaration contain no factual

allegations 0f nonfraudulent, but otherwise wrongful conduct

constructive trust. See Witt

v.

which would support creation 0f a

Jones, 111 Idaho at 168, 722 P.2d at 479.” (R.151) The complaint
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and declaration sufﬁciently allege

that Hillbroom’s trust received millions

of dollars from

Lujan’s efforts and the trust did not pay those fees. Hillbroom’s creation 0f a second, secret trust
at the

same time Lujan was incurring millions

in legal fees that

were not paid

at least creates a

question of fact as to whether the a constructive trust should be imposed on this property.

“A

constructive trust arises Where legal

title

t0 property has

been obtained through actual

fraud, misrepresentations, concealments, taking advantage of one's necessities, or

circumstances otherwise rendering

it

unconscionable for the holder of legal

beneﬁcial interest in the property.” Davenport

The evidence before

the Court

agreement With the trustee 0f the 1999

and obtained enough funds

same time
trustee,

that

t0 entitle

Lujan was obtaining

to

Hillbroom created a new

trust

all this

that Luj an

in charge

of both

trusts,

it

since

it

money

new trust

had money

trust for his

to

Lujan entered into a fee

performed his part of the agreement

1999

for the

trust,

which were not paid. At the
Hillbroom and the other

as co-trustees 0f that trust

buy property

in

all

and

Hope, Idaho.

beneﬁt in 2005, did not disclose that

presumably transferred

and then used those funds

that

t0 $3,791, 125.97 in fees,

Keith Weibel, 0f the 1999 trust created a

presumably transferred money

was

Lujan

and

t0 retain

Burke, 30 Idaho 599, 167 P. 481 (1917).

v.

0n summary judgment was
trust

title

under

fact t0 Luj an,

the assets of the 1999 trust to the 2005

to purchase the subj ect property for the

2005

trust.

Hillbroom did

not pay Lujan’s fees and has not paid Lujan’s judgment for those fees.

The evidence 0n summary judgment Viewed
Hillbroom created a new
charge 0f both

trusts,

trust for his

beneﬁt

presumably transferred

in

in the light

most favorable

to Luj an is that

2005, did not disclose that fact t0 Luj an, was in

all

the assets of the 1999 trust t0 the

then used those funds t0 purchase the subj ect property for the 2005

Lujan’s fees and has not paid Lujan’s judgment for those fees.

12

trust.

2005

trust

and

Hillbroom did not pay

These

facts establish circumstances rending

and

t0 this property unless

until

have dismissed Luj an’s claim

Lujan

6.

is

it

unconscionable for Hillbroom t0 retain

he pays Luj an’s judgment, and the District Court should not

t0

impose a constructive

entitled t0 attorney’s fees

trust

0n summary judgment.

0n appeal because n0 evidence supports

the District Courts inference and defending this appeal

It is

a

title

is

frivolous.

undisputed that n0 evidence in this record supports the District Court’s inference that

“name search” could have

easily revealed this transaction. Furthermore, the

Idaho’s Constructive Notice statute, Idaho

is

clear that

Code 55-81 1. This appeal should not be defended,

and the matter should be remanded With instructions

was funded by

law

t0 allow Luj an to determine if the

2005

trust

the 1999 trust.

Reasonable attorney fees are available to the prevailing party under

I.C. §

12—121

if the

Court determines that the appeal was brought 0r defended frivolously, unreasonably, 0r without
foundation. Spencer

v.

Jameson, 147 Idaho 497, 507, 211 P.3d 106, 116 (2009).

IV.

CONCLUSION

Keith Weibel retained the services of David Luj an to secure funds for the trust of Which

he was a trustee and Which was for the beneﬁt 0f Junior Hillbroom. As Lujan performed his end

of the bargain, and earned in excess 0f $3,000,000 in
separate, secret, trust

and funded

it

most

fees,

likely With funds

Weibel and Hillbroom created a
from the 1999

trust.

Weibel and

Hillbroom then refused t0 pay Luj an and Luj an obtained a judgment against them in
capacities 0f trustees 0f a trust, the 1999 trust, that does not appear to

facts support the imposition

from the 2005

of a constructive

trust

trust.
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their

own any property. These

upon a property owned by Hillbroom acquired

The
With cash.

transactions that occur to fund trusts and

buy property

are not generally conducted

HOW this 2005 trust came to be funded Will be a simple matter t0 establish and Lujan

should have been afforded the opportunity to do

so.

This Court should reverse the District Court’s dismissal 0f Luj an’s complaint with
instructions t0 allow Luj an to conduct further discovery.

DATED this

10th

day of December, 2020.

ﬂ

ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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